We develop and analyze a model of strategic redistricting. Two parties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a majority in the House of Representatives. We show that in the unique equilibrium parties maximally segregate their opponent's supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. Ceteris paribus, the stronger party segregates more than the weaker one, the election outcome is biased in favor of the stronger party and against the party whose supporters are easier to identify. Finally, we incorporate policy choice into our redistricting game. When one party is in control of redistricting, the equilibrium policy choice is biased towards the policy preferences of the redistricting party's supporters. However, if the district level uncertainty is sufficiently small, this effect disappears and redistricting becomes policy neutral. † We thank
Introduction
Regional differences in population growth periodically necessitate changing congressional districts' boundaries. This redistricting process creates intense conflict between political parties. In this paper, we analyze the redistricting process for the House of Representatives and the interaction between redistricting and policy choice.
States face few constraints when setting their congressional districts' boundaries: congressional districts must have the same population and must be contiguous which, in practice, is a fairly permissive constraint. A well-known example, Illinois's 4-th congressional district combines two disjoint areas through a very narrow strip. In short, a political party that controls a state's political institutions has wide latitude in designing a favorable electoral map. In some cases, independent commissions rather than individual parties control the redistricting process. We ignore such bipartisan redistricting and assume that a single party controls each state's political institutions. Bipartisan redistricting can be incorporated into our model by giving parties control of less than 100% of the districts and interpreting the remainder as an exogenous non-partisan redistricting plan.
We model the strategic interaction between the two parties as a zero-sum game under uncertainty. We recognize that parties and different agents within parties may evaluate election outcomes in different ways; incumbents may want to protect their own seats while other party members may wish to maximize the number of representatives. We focus, however, on the most important election outcome: majority control in the House of Representatives 1
Our model combines Downs-Hotelling style party competition with redistricting. We assume that the two parties' supporters have a different distribution of policy preferences (i.e., ideal points). The overall distribution of ideal points is a θ−weighted average of these two distributions where θ is the proportion of Republicans in the population. In section 2, we fix the party policies and study redistricting in isolation. Voter characteristics and an uncertain aggregate state determine the fraction of Republican voters in the population.
Parties observe voter characteristics but do not know the aggregate state when they redistrict. We show that equilibrium is unique. In equilibrium, parties maximize the number 1 In section 3, we analyze how a desire to protect incumbents changes our model. of seats they would get if aggregate uncertainty were to resolve in a manner that yields each party half of the seats. We call this particular outcome of aggregate uncertainty the critical state. In the optimal redistricting plan, party 1 (the Republican party) picks a cutoff characteristic and combines all voters above the cutoff into uniform districts. Hence, parties segregate voters with unfavorable characteristics and combine voters with favorable characteristics. This description of the optimal strategy generalizes Owen and Grofman's (1988) well-known pack-and-crack gerrymandering strategy. 2 We compare the equilibrium behaviors of the strong and weak parties: assume, for simplicity, that the two parties face the same, symmetric ex ante distribution of characteristics. One party-the strong party-controls a larger territory than the other-the weak party. We show that the strong party will choose a more segregated redistricting plan.
Specifically, the strong party will create fewer and more lopsided favorable districts than the weak party. The weak party will create fewer unfavorable districts and more balanced favorable districts.
One focus of the empirical literature on redistricting (see, for example, Gelman and King (1990) , Cox and Katz (1999) ) is the notion of bias. These papers estimate a voteseat curve that relates a party's vote share to its share of seats and define bias as the excess seat share (i.e., seat share minus 1 / 2 ) the party would have had with a vote share of 1 / 2 . Hence, the bias favors a party if its excess seat share is positive. 3 We show that the election is biased in the strong party's favor. Furthermore, in each territory, there is a local bias favoring the redistricting party. The local bias is always greater in the strong party's territory than in the weak party's territory. Thus, overall bias is related to local bias: if the election is biased in party 1's favor, then territory 1 will exhibit more bias than territory 2. 4 Cox and Katz (2002) study the evolution of local bias after Republican and Democratic redistricting plans between 1946 and 1970. This period encompasses the redistricting revolution (triggered by Baker vs Carr (1962) and subsequent Supreme Court decisions) which the authors argue greatly strengthened the Democratic party. Their results indicate that the pre-revolutionary Republican redistricting plans' biases were larger than the post-revolutionary Republican redistricting plans' biases while the opposite holds for Democratic redistricting plans. This finding is consistent with our model's predictions since Republican party was the stronger party before the revolution and became the weaker party afterwards. Rodden (2007) provides evidence that in the US and in other industrialized countries left-leaning voters tend to be more concentrated than right-leaning voters. For example, in the 2000 presidential election, the smallest Democratic vote share in any congressional district was 24% while there were 24 districts with a Democratic vote share over 80% and 5 districts with a Democratic vote share over 90%. Our model predicts the redistricting party will try to "pack" as many of its opponents as possible into designated losing districts. Hence, the 2000 election suggests that segregating Democratic voters is easier than segregating the Republican voters. We examine how such asymmetries affect the parties' electoral prospects. For example, suppose 2's supporters are easier to identify and therefore easier to segregate than 1's supporters. This could be due to geographic concentration of 2 supporters or because 2's support is correlated with some observable variables such as ethnicity. We show that if parties are otherwise in a symmetric situation, then the election will be biased in 1's favor. Identifying its own supporters is less valuable for a party than identifying its opponent's supporters since the optimal redistricting plan requires segregating opponent's supporters and pooling the party's own supporters into uniform districts.
Finally, we incorporate policy choice into our redistricting game and examine how redistricting plans affect this choice. Our extended model combines Downs-Hotelling style party competition with redistricting. For simplicity, we assume that one party controls all redistricting and show that policy choice will be biased away from the overall median towards the policy preferences of the redistricting party's supporters. Equilibrium policy choice targets the median in redistricting party's favorable districts because when the election is close, those districts will be the most hotly contested. Notice that this result holds even though parties care only about winning a majority in the House of Representatives.
Related Literature
Our work builds on Owen and Grofman (1988) who show that when there is local uncertainty but no aggregate uncertainty, both the redistricting plan that maximizes the expected number of seats and the plan that maximizes the probability of winning a majority create two types of districts, ones that overwhelmingly favor the opponent and others that the party is expected to win. 5 In our model, the redistricting party observes a one-dimensional signal that determines the probability a particular voter is a Democrat or a Republican. A key feature of our setting is that parties have limited information about voters' policy preferences. Friedman and Holden (2008a) show that when parties receive a sufficiently informative signal of each voter's policy preference, the optimal redistricting plan matches extreme types, i.e., the most favorable types are placed in the same district as the least favorable types, the second most favorable types are placed with the second least favorable types and so on. Friedman and Holden (2008b) analyzes competitive redistricting. Here, the authors first extend the earlier paper's characterization of optimal strategies to the strategic setting. Later, they explore some consequences of abandoning the assumption that parties have nearperfect information about each voter's policy preferences. In section 3.5 below, we discuss their work in more detail and relate their information assumptions to the assumptions of Proposition 1.
Coate and Knight (2006) and Gilligan and Matsusaka (2005) study socially optimal redistricting plans. An important redistricting constraint is the mandate to create and maintain districts with a substantial majority of minority voters. 6 Cameron, Epstein and O'Hallaran (1996), Epstein and O'Hallaran (1999), Shotts (2002) , Katz and Grigg (2005) analyze the impact of majority-minority districts on the welfare of minorities. In our model, the mandate to create majority-minority districts amounts to a lower bound on 5 For a generalization of Owen and Grofman see Sherstyuk (1998) . 6 The Voting Rights Act mandates adequate representation of minorities which courts have interpreted as a mandate to create districts with a significant majority of minority voters. 
Voting
In this section, we introduce a stochastic median voter model with fixed party positions. This model provides the framework for the redistricting game we describe in section 3. Our model has the following key features: (1) Parties redistrict based on incomplete information about voters' party affiliation; (2) variation in the abilities of district candidates causes correlation in voter behavior within a district, and finally (3) aggregate factors that affect the fortunes of the two parties cause correlation in voter behavior at the national level. The details of our model our described below.
Voters have symmetric, single-peaked preferences over the policy space IR. A voter's ideal point is unknown to parties at the time of redistricting. However, parties can observe the Republican (and hence the Democratic) vote share in each voting precinct 7 and other demographic information. Based on this information, parties assess the probability that a 7 A voting precinct is the smallest geographical area for which vote shares of parties are observable. particular voter is a Republican or a Democrat. Republicans have ideal points drawn from the cumulative distribution I 1 and Democrats have ideal points drawn from I 2 .
After redistricting but before the election, some voters move or change their party affiliation. An aggregate state affects the transition of voter affiliations. To be concrete, let the mechanism through which the aggregate state affects voting behavior be as follows:
each voter is replaced with probability 2α; the replacement will be a Republican with probability s 0 if the aggregate state is s 0 . Hence, if the share of Republicans voters at redistricting time in a given large population is ω 0 , the corresponding share on voting day will be (1 − 2α)ω 0 + 2αs 0 .
We call ω = (1−2α)ω 0 +α the characteristic of this pool of voters and let s = 2αs 0 −α be the (re-scaled) aggregate state. When the pool consists of all voters in a particular district, we call ω the district characteristic. Hence, if state s occurs, the ideal point distribution on the day of voting in a district with characteristic ω is 
If I 1 has a density, then the curvature restriction says that this density is decreasing on The symmetry assumptions are made for convenience. Our main results, Theorems 1-3, are unaffected if we drop symmetry and impose a curvature assumption on I 2 analogous to the curvature assumption on I 1 . By contrast, the curvature restrictions on I 1 , I 2 and L are important for our analysis; they are needed for proving that the district outcome function is continuous and has the right curvature properties. 8
Let θ = ω + s be the proportion of Republicans in the district on voting day. The median for a given θ, x(θ), is the ideal point x that solves
Increasing the proportion of Republicans moves x(θ) to the right. Assumption (iii) implies that for each θ, there is a unique median and that this median is strictly increasing in θ 8 See Lemma 1 below.
with x(1/2) = 0. Party 1 wins the district if d < x(θ) and therefore, the probability that party 1 wins a district with a θ-proportion of Republicans is
We call the function π the District Outcome Function (DOF). Lemma 1 below establishes that the DOF is convex over the range in which 1 is more likely to win and concave over the range in which 2 is more likely to win. Hence, as the leading party's support increases, its probability of winning increases at a decreasing rate. 
Proof: See the Appendix.
Assumptions (i) -(iii) provide a median voter model with local noise that yields a DOF with the curvature and symmetry described in the lemma above. Assumption (i) requires the distribution of local uncertainty to be S-shaped and continuous. If L admits a density, the assumption implies that this density has mode zero and is single peaked. We can interpret this assumption as saying that small differences in candidate competence are more likely than large differences. 9 Suppose the ability to avoid scandals is how candidate competence is measured. Then, our curvature assumption would be violated if, for example, there is either no scandal or a large scandal but no intermediate scandals.
The DOF has a particularly simple form when there is no local uncertainty. Suppose
Notice that π ∞ is inconsistent with Assumptions (i) and (ii) since it is not continuous.
However, if L is normal with mean zero and variance 1/n, then for large n, the resulting π approximates π ∞ and satisfies Assumptions (i)-(iii). Hence, we can study the no local uncertainty case as a limit. 9 We thank a referee for pointing out this implication of Assumption (i).
Redistricting
In the preceding section, we have described a stochastic median voter model (with fixed policy positions). In the redistricting game, each party maximizes its probability of winning a majority in the House by optimally allocating voters among the districts it controls. To avoid integer problems and simplify the analysis, we assume that each party controls a continuum of districts. If the segregation constraint, F , has a single element in its support, then F itself is the only feasible redistricting plan. We rule out this trivial case and assume that both parties face a nondegenerate segregation constraint, i.e., 0 < F (z) < 1 for some z. Since there is a continuum of districts, the "law of large numbers" ensures that, with strategy H, party 1 wins D(H, s) districts in its territory in state s, where
Party 1's total seat share in the House given state s and the strategy profile (H, H ) is
and therefore party 1 wins the election if
Party 2 chooses H to minimize this probability. Parties do not know s and have beliefs
The cumulative distribution of these beliefs is strictly increasing on S and continuous. These assumptions ensure that (i) neither party can win the election with probability 1, (ii) there must exist an aggregate state, the critical state, at which both parties win the same number of Representatives, and (iii) the probability of such a tie is zero. Theorem 1 below asserts that the equilibrium strategy profile is unique. This result requires the existence of such a critical state. Beyond guaranteeing the existence of critical state, the aggregate state distribution play no role in our analysis and therefore we do not specify it.
A redistricting game is a triple Λ = (F, G, λ), where F , G are the redistricting constraints of 1 and 2 respectively and λ is the size of party 1's territory. If G = F , we sometimes write Λ = (F, λ). We assume that parties choose their redistricting plans simultaneously. In practice, redistricting is done rather infrequently and parties rarely choose their plans simultaneously. Our analysis is robust to the timing of moves: any sequencing of redistricting decisions would lead to the same equilibrium outcome as our simultaneous move game.
An Example with No Local Uncertainty
In this simple example, we assume no local uncertainty as described in equation (NLU) above. Hence,
The segregation constraints F and G assign probability Suppose that 1 establishes two kinds of districts in its territory; unfavorable districts "packed" solely with 2 supporters (i.e., ω = 1/4) and mixed districts that 1 expects to win. Since 1 controls 2 / 3 of the electoral map, if the share of the favorable districts in its own territory is above 3 / 4 , then it wins more than
/ 2 of all districts and therefore wins the election. Because party 1 has a larger territory than party 2, we can guess that with equal vote shares party 1 will win the election. This means that in the critical state party 2 will have more votes than party 1 which means that 1 will not win any district in 2's territory. Hence, in the critical state, party 1 must tie the election without winning any districts in 2's territory. That is, 1 must win at least 3 / 4 of its own districts.
To create a 3 / 4 proportion of favorable districts, 1 must combine all of 1's supporters with half of the 2 supporters. The average characteristic in these mixed districts will be
Hence, 1 will win the election as long as Hence, 2 has multiple equilibrium strategies in this example. In Theorem 1, π is strictly increasing (i.e., there is local uncertainty) and hence this multiplicity is ruled out. 12 
Equilibrium Strategies
We show in Theorem 1 below that party 1's equilibrium strategy fully segregates the lower p-percentile of characteristics and creates a mass of uniform districts with the same average from the upper 1 − p-percentile. If F is continuous, then there is a cutoff z such that for ω ≤ z, the redistricting plan coincides with the segregation constraint while characteristics above z are combined into uniform districts ω *
. We call such a strategy a p−segregation plan and let F p denote the p−segregation plan for the redistricting constraint Henceforth, we identify equilibrium strategies with the pair (p, q). We call the state at which the election is tied in the unique equilibrium the critical state and denote it s(Λ).
Parties' redistricting plans maximize their seat shares at the critical state. To see why, assume party 1 can improve its seat share at the critical state by choosing some a nonequilibrium strategy. Then, continuity implies that the party also wins in states slightly below (worse than) the critical state and hence party 1 wins a majority with greater probability, contradicting the optimality of the equilibrium strategy.
The p−segregation plan maximally segregates districts in the convex part of π (districts that are most favorable to the opponent). We can provide a simple characterization of party 1's optimal p if F has a density f > 0 and π is differentiable. Let s = s(Λ) be the critical state, p = F (z). Define ω z = 1 (1−p) ω≥z ωf (ω)dω. Hence, ω z is the average characteristic in the favorable districts given the distribution F . Then, 1's optimal strategy must satisfy:
We illustrate this equation in Figure 2 below.
To understand this equation, suppose party 1 considers marginally raising the cutoff z (and hence raising p). Raising z increases the average characteristic in the favorable districts. This benefit yields an increase
the mass of districts that party 1 wins. Raising z also decreases the proportion of districts with the favorable characteristic. The cost of this decrease is −f (z)(π(ω z +s * )−π(z +s * )).
At the optimum these two effects must cancel.
Incumbency Protection and Majority-Minority Districts
We assume that parties maximize the probability of winning a majority in the House of Representatives. As we argue in the introduction, given the rules of the House of Representatives, this is the natural party objective. However, individual representatives also have an incentive to guarantee their own election and therefore parties may have to balance incumbent protection with the objective of achieving a majority.
To incorporate the incumbency protection objective into our model, suppose an ι-fraction of districts in party 1's territory are incumbent districts that must be protected.
In particular, party 1 decides that incumbents should carry their districts with a probability at least γ > 1/2. If this goal is feasible, then there is a district characteristicω such that
(where the expectation is over the aggregate uncertainty s).
For simplicity, assume that the redistricting constraint F has support {α, 1 − α}. If one of these constraints is violated, i.e., there are too few favorable districts in the optimal redistricting plan (p < ι) or the favorable districts are not safe enough (ω * <ω), then the (constrained) optimal redistricting plan can be found in two steps: first, create an ι-proportion ofω-districts. Then, compute the new redistricting constraint,F , for the remaining districts. 13 Then, choose an optimal redistricting plan, as described in the proof of Theorem 1, given the new constraintF . Hence, parties will still choose p−redistricting but ι · λ-fraction of districts will be beyond the control of either party. Clearly, there is a trade-off between the need to protect incumbents (as measured by γ) and the party's electoral success. A more sophisticated objective function would be one where parties trade-off the probability of winning a majority against incumbent protection.
Let
While an analysis of this trade-off is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that the equilibrium redistricting strategy that emerges from such a model is as described above: a fraction of districts will be designed to protect incumbents and p−segregation plan will be applied to the remainder. 14 Like incumbency protection, The Voting Rights Act, which Courts have interpreted as a mandate to create districts with a significant majority of minority voters, constrains party's redistricting options. If minority voters favor the Democratic party, then the Voting Rights Act means that there will be a ι fraction of districts with average characteristic at or belowω < 1 / 2 . Assume that meeting the mandate is feasible for either party. Then, for the Democratic party, the mandate's effect is similar to that of protecting incumbents:
Ifω < ω * or if ι > 1 − p, the mandate constrains the Democratic party and the optimal redistricting plan is determined by the two-step procedure outlined above.
For the Republican party, creating districts that are sufficiently favorable to the opponent can never be a constraint since the optimal redistricting plan does just that. However, the optimal redistricting plan may not create enough opponent-favorable districts to meet the mandate. Consider again the case in which F has a binary support {α, 1 − α}. Since the mandate is feasible, it must be that α ≤ω. If p ≥ ι, then the mandate does not constrain party 1; it simply ensures that an ι fraction of the districts favorable to party 2 are minority districts. If p < ι however, then the optimal plan for party 1 does not yield enough party 2-favorable districts to meet the mandate. In that case, the constrained optimal redistricting plan isp = ι. 15 14 Herron and Wiseman (2008) use observed redistricting plans to assess redistrictors' intentions. Their focus is on theories of legislative policy choice. An extended version of our model that includes incumbency protection could be used to infer a party's weight on incumbent protection from the observed redistricting plans. 15 We are grateful to a referee for pointing out this effect. The analysis above is simplified by the assumption of a binary support for F . In the general case, there are many ways to create a district with average characteristicω. As a result, the details of the segregation constraint affect the constrained-optimal redistricting plan making its computation more involved. However, the conclusion stays the same -we can describe the optimal redistricting plan by a two step procedure in which first the constraint is met and then the optimal p−redistricting plan for an appropriately defined residual redistricting constraint is found.
Multiple Redistricting Constraints
We have assumed that a single cumulative distribution function describes all redistricting constraints that a party faces within its territory. This would be the case, for example, if a party could draw its electoral map without regard to state boundaries and other geographical considerations. In practice, parties are not allowed to create districts that cross state lines or connect distant regions within a state. Theorem 1 can easily be extended to deal with these additional restrictions. We can model a party's territory as a collection of regions and define a different redistricting constraint for each region. In equilibrium, each party will choose a distinct p−redistricting plan for every region in its territory. Each such plan will maximize the party's seat share at the critical s.
We assume a continuum of districts. This essential simplifying assumption enables us to apply the law of large numbers to the district level (local) uncertainty. Since there are 435 congressional districts, this aspect of the assumption seems relatively unproblematic.
The continuum assumption also allows us to ignore integer constraints. In reality, the feasible distributions of district characteristics can only approximate the optimal p−segregation plan since there are finitely many districts in each territory. The p−segregation plans are accurate approximations of the optimal plan for large territories (such as California or New York) but less accurate approximations for small territories. 
Comparison to the Friedman and Holden Analysis
The difference between the optimal redistricting plans in There are two important features of the Friedman-Holden optimal redistricting plans:
first, and most importantly, for every N , the distribution of medians associated with their optimal plan stochastically dominates any other feasible distribution. Hence, FriedmanHolden optimal plans are optimal for any increasing W . Therefore, the Friedman-Holden characterization of optimal plans is valid even in a strategic setting. Second, optimal plans never segregate extreme unfavorable types or create identical districts of favorable types.
In contrast, we assume that H(· | y) = on W (m(G F )). We assume this effect is S-shaped in m(G F ), i.e., the benefit increases 16 Near-perfect signals is a sufficient condition. Friedman-Holden (2008) give a nice example that does not have near-perfect information but leads to their characterization of optimal plans. Similarly, our conditions are sufficient conditions and there are examples that violate them but lead to redistricting plans as characterized in Proposition 1 above.
as m(G F ) increases up to a critical value and then decreases. Under our assumptions, an optimal redistricting plan for the N districts is a finite analogue of the p−segregation strategy described in Proposition 1 and converges to a p−segregation strategy as N goes to infinity.
Notice that our assumptions imply that signals cannot be very informative. 17 Therefore, the Friedman-Holden paper and our paper are complementary. Together, they illustrate how optimal redistricting depends on the available information. Our results apply when information is coarse while Friedman and Holden characterization applies when parties have precise information about voter ideal points.
Party Strength, Bias, and Segregation
In this section, we relate the redistricting game's parameters to equilibrium outcomes. 
Letẑ be the optimal cutoff when the critical state is s(Λ) and let z be the optimal cutoff when the critical state is s(Λ). Since s(Λ) > s(Λ)
and ω z is increasing in z, the tangency illustrated in the Figure implies thatẑ < z. 18 In Theorem 2, party 1's redistricting constraint is fixed while the other parameters of the game may change. Although the distribution of aggregate uncertainty plays no role in our analysis, it does affect a party's probability of winning. If the probability distribution over states remains constant, then increasing a party's strength increases its probability of winning. However, Theorem 2 remains valid even if the probability distribution over states changes as other parameters change. In that case, a party's strength refers to its ability to win in unfavorable circumstances and not to its probability of winning.
We say that the game, Λ, is biased in 1's favor if s(Λ) < 0 and in 2's favor if s(Λ) > 0.
If s(Λ) < 0 (> 0), then party 1 (2) can win the election even though a majority of voters prefer party 2 (1). The bias in territory i is defined analogously. Let
where (p, q) is the unique equilibrium of Λ. Hence, s i (Λ) is the aggregate state that would yield a tie in territory i. Arguments analogous to the ones made for s(Λ) ensure that s i (Λ) is also well defined. Theorem 3 below establishes that the local bias always favors the redistricting party. Also, it shows that the local bias increases when the redistricting party becomes stronger.
Finally, Theorem 3 shows that bias grows as the strong party gets stronger.
Theorem 3: (i) For any
Λ, s 1 (Λ) ≤ 0 ≤ s 2 (Λ) and s 1 (Λ) ≤ s(Λ) ≤ s 2 (Λ). (ii) Let Λ = (F, G, λ),Λ = (F,Ĝ,λ). If s(Λ) ≤ s(Λ), then s 1 (Λ) ≤ s 1 (
Λ). (iii) The critical state s(F, G, λ) is decreasing in λ.
Proof: See Appendix. Theorem 3 relies on two key observations: let p s be the p that maximizes party 1's vote share, D(F p , s), in state s. In Theorem 2, we showed that the stronger party 1 is, 18 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting use of the Figure to explain Let s = s(Λ) and s 1 = s 1 (Λ). First, assume that s < 0. In that case, party 2 can win more than half of the seats in its territory in state s. (For example, a uniform redistricting plan would yield more than half of the seats to 2.) Since the election is tied at s, party 1 must win more than half of the seats in its territory as well. Hence, we have
Then, the monotonicity of D implies that s 1 ≤ s < 0.
Next, assume s ≥ 0 and therefore p s ≤ p 0 and
The last equality follows since at s = 0, a uniform redistricting plan yields each party 19 In that case, the estimated bias for Republican 19 Computing the the biases defined above from their estimated seat-vote curve is straightforward.
plans drops from 2.3% to essentially zero while the estimated bias for Democratic plans increases from 1.1% to 2.1%.
The following corollary summarizes our comparative statics results under the assumption that parties face the same redistricting constraint but have different size territories.
For any distribution F ∈ F , ρ(F ) denotes the distribution of 1 − ω. The distribution F is symmetric if ρ(F ) = F . We say that the game is symmetric if both parties face the same symmetric redistricting constraint F . Hence, in a symmetric redistricting game both parties' situation is identical except for the sizes of their territories. The following corollary shows that if the game is symmetric, the election will be biased in favor of the party with the larger territory; the stronger party will choose a more segregating redistricting plan (i.e., create more lopsided districts) and generate a more biased electoral map in its territory. its seat share at s(Λ) but not at s-that is, the optimal redistricting plan at s has less segregation (smaller p) than the equilibrium plan)-1 will win many districts with a larger margin of victory than would be optimal in the seat maximizing plan. Hence, it may appear as if 1 is creating overly safe districts. In contrast, 2's redistricting plan will appear as if it has segregated too little; it's seat share would increase, had it created more safe districts. A symmetric argument applies for s > s(Λ). Thus, the winner will appear to be overly conservative while the loser will seem overly aggressive in its redistricting.
We conclude this section with an analysis of how differences in segregation opportunities affect the equilibrium outcome. A mean preserving spread of the segregation constraint means that the party is less constrained, and therefore, makes the party stronger. Such a change may come about through better information; that is, greater ability to identify voters. Note that F = G does not mean that both parties have the same segregation opportunities. For example, if one party has some supporters that are easily identified by their ethnicity or their address while the other party has no such reliable indicators of support but both parties faces the same distribution of voters, we will have F = G but F will be different at low values than at high values.
Note, however, that if F = G and F is symmetric (i.e., ρ(F ) = F ), then both parties' supporters are equally difficult to segregate. More generally, suppose F is not symmetric.
Let H ∈ F be such that H coincides with F for ω < 0 and is symmetric. Hence, H is the symmetric characteristic distribution in which both parties' supporters are distributed like the party 2's supporters in F . If H is a mean preserving spread of F , then we can conclude that in the game with F = G, party 2's supporters are more "spread out" than party 1's supporters and therefore easier to segregate. That is, party 2's supporters are easier to segregate if the distribution of low characteristics is a mean preserving spread of the distribution of high characteristics. Theorem 4 establishes that the equilibrium outcome is biased against the party whose supporters can be segregated more readily. To understand this result, consider a change that increases both parties' ability to segregate party 2's supporters: this change does not help party 2 in territory 2 because its equilibrium strategy (the p−segregation plan) creates uniform districts of supporters. However, since maximally segregating the opponent's supporters is optimal, party 1 benefits from its increased ability to segregate party 2's supporters. We can interpret our model as a setting in which parties have a limited ability to commit. The fixed policy dimension represents policy choices for which commitment is not possible. In that case, voters substitute the ideal point of the party to predict the future policy choice. The new dimension represents a policy choice where parties' announcements prior to the election are credible and hence parties are able to commit.
Definition: Party 2's supporters are easier to segregate at F if there is H ∈ F such that ρ(H) = H, H(ω) = F (ω) for ω <

Party 1 wins the district if
Let π y (θ) be the probability that 1 wins a district with θ-share of Republicans given policies y = (y 1 , y 2 ). Let d(θ) be the value of d that solves
That is,
Note that whenever y 1 = y 2 , we have d(θ) = x(θ) and therefore π y is the same DOF as the one studied in section 2.2. Hence,
whenever y 1 = y 2 . We maintain assumptions (i)-(iii) from section 2 and therefore π y has the same properties as the function π in the previous sections when y 1 = y 2 .
The policy choices affect the competence differential required to win a district and hence affect the probability of winning that district. Expression (W) implies that choosing a policy as close as possible to the district median maximizes the probability of winning.
Of course, different districts have different median ideal points and therefore, in general, no policy is optimal in every district. Moreover, the aggregate state affects the district median and therefore increasing the probability of winning in some aggregate state may reduce the probability of winning in other states.
To examine the interaction between redistricting and policy choice, we consider the simple case in which party 1 controls all districts (λ = 1). Hence, Party 1's redistricting constraint, F , parameterizes the redistricting game. Party 1 first chooses its redistricting plan and its policy and then, party 2 chooses its policy. We employ the sequential structure to rule out mixed strategy equilibria. Pure strategy equilibria when party 1 first chooses a redistricting plan and then both parties simultaneously choose policies would be identical to the equilibria analyzed below. However, we cannot ensure the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for the latter game. 22
As is the previous sections, a feasible redistricting plan is a mean preserving spread of the redistricting constraint F . In aggregate state s, party 1 wins a seat share of
and Proof: See Appendix.
To gain intuition for Theorem 5, note that the policy choice, like the redistricting plan, must maximize the probability of winning a majority of representatives. In particular, this implies that both choices must maximize the seat share in the critical state s. There are two types of districts, districts that favor party 1 and districts that favor party 2.
In the critical state, any policy to the right of the median in party 1-favorable districts (x(ω * (p) + s)) cannot maximize vote share since it is to the right of the median in every district.
To see that no policy to the left of x(ω * (p) + s * ) cannot be optimal, recall that a basic property of optimal redistricting plans is that, in the critical state, districts favorable to party 1 (the party in charge of redistricting) are less lopsided than districts favorable to party 2. Now, suppose both parties choose the policy x(ω + s * ) and consider a leftward deviation by one of the parties (y i < x(ω +s * )). This will increase the deviators probability of picking up a seat in districts favorable to party 2 but reduce the probability of picking up a seat in districts favorable to party 1. Note that the impact of a policy change is greater in districts that are more closely contested. As a result, in the districts favorable to party 1, the negative impact of the leftward shift is greater than the corresponding positive impact in the districts favorable to party 2. Moreover, since the election is tied in the critical state it follows that there are more districts favorable to party 1 than districts favorable to party 2. As a result, the leftward shift in policy reduces the deviator's seat share in the critical state and therefore reduces the deviator's payoff. 23
23 The intuitive argument implicitly assumes that the policy deviation is not too large so that districts favorable to party 2 remain the more lopsided districts. The assumption β ≤ 1 is required to deal with large deviations.
To evaluate the impact of redistricting on policy choice, consider the benchmark case where all districts are identical and have type ω = 1/2. The optimal policy is the median preferred policy in the critical state. It is straightforward to verify that the critical state is 0 in this case and therefore the median voter's ideal point in every district is zero.
The equilibrium policy when party 1 redistricts differs from this benchmark for two reasons. First, parties cater to districts that favor party 1, that is, districts with type Theorem 5 shows that policies are biased towards the party who controls redistricting because policies will target districts favorable to the party in control of redistricting. However, the advantage gained from redistricting means that the critical state moves to the left and this effect mitigates the impact of redistricting on policy outcomes. In particular, when local uncertainty is small, gerrymandering only affects the probability of winning but has almost no effect on policy choices.
Conclusion
We have described how aggregate uncertainty creates strategic interaction between parties' redistricting decisions. This uncertainty ensures that one party's redistricting plan affects the other party's optimal action even though the fraction of districts a party wins at any particular state s is a separable function of its own and its opponents redistricting plans. Despite the vital role aggregate uncertainty, the distribution of this uncertainty does not affect equilibrium strategies. It follows that asymmetric information regarding this distribution will have no effect on equilibrium outcomes.
Our model provides a framework for analyzing the interaction between redistricting and other decisions. We have considered one such interaction by adding a policy choice to our model. Other decisions such as the allocation of campaign resources across districts or the policy choices of individual candidates who care only about the outcome in their own district can also be studied within our framework. 
Appendix
Note that for θ ≥ 1 / 2 , I 2 (x(θ)) = 1 and therefore
Then, it is enough to show that
The convexity of I 2 and (A1) imply
Then, the strict concavity of − 1 z yields (A2) as desired.
Preliminary Results
Lemma 2 Proof: Equation (3) in Section 2 establishes that θ = ω + s. Hence, θ and therefore π is increasing and continuous in s. Then, equations (4) and (5) Define, for θ ∈ [0,
Recall that π is strictly concave on [ / 2 ] and note that the resulting φ is also decreasing with φ(
We record these observations in the Lemma below:
Lemma φ: The function φ is continuous and decreasing. For all θ ∈ [0,
For any F ∈ F, let F p − be the distribution of the lower p−percentile. That is,
Recall that F p + is the distribution of the upper 1 − p-percentile and therefore 
When the choices of F and s are clear, we write ω(p), ω * (p), and W (p) instead.
A correspondence h from the reals to nonempty subsets of reals is increasing if x ≥ x , w ∈ h(x), w ∈ h(x ) implies w ≥ w and is strictly increasing if the second inequality above is strict whenever the first one is strict. Proof: First, we note that the set {F ∈ F |F F } is closed in the topology of weak convergence. Since F is compact, it follows that the constraint set of (A3) is compact.
Since D is continuous (Lemma 2), a solution exists. Next, we will show that this solution is unique and is a segregation plan.
Note that ifω(F ) + s ≤ 0, then since π is strictly convex on [0, 
Proof: Follows from elementary arguments.
Step 2: 
min W (0) > 0 and since W is increasing, w > 0 for all w, p such that w ∈ W (p). If 
Step 3: F p F is the unique optimal redistricting plan.
Hence, π * is the line that runs through both (ω F +s, π(ω F +s)) and (ω * 
have the same mean. We conclude that ω i ∈ Ω for i = 1, 2 and therefore
Then, define,
and let H be the distribution that has support {ω 1 , ω 2 } and satisfies H(ω 1 ) = α. Also, let Next, we show that the critical state is s along the equilibrium path. To see this, first note that party 2 can always match party 1's policy choice. Since the redistricting plan is optimal for the case in which both parties choose the same policy, it follows that the critical state can be no lower than s. Conversely, if party 1 chooses F p and y 1 , then, by the claim above, party 2's unique best response is to choose y 2 . Therefore, the critical state must be equal to s.
By Theorem 1 and the fact that party 2 can match party 1's policy, this implies that in any equilibrium the redistricting plan must be equal to F p . By the claim above, it then follows that party 1 must choose y 1 and party 2 must choose y 2 along the equilibrium path.
To establish existence of equilibrium in every subgame, note that for any redistricting plan F ∈ H and any policy choice for party 1, there exists an optimal policy for party 2.
This follows from the continuity of party 2's payoff function. 
